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Abstract
By the late 1970s, supply-side theory had become something of a new
economic orthodoxy. From the supply-side perspective, labour market
inflexibility explains mass unemployment. In this context the presumably
greater flexibility of the labour market in the USA was seen as an explanation
of its superior employment record relative to European economies. Unlike
most European countries, Sweden, which is highly regulated, does reason-
ably well in employment terms. The authors conclude that the Swedish model
has proved its value with regard to labour market policy, especially with
regard to the duration of unemployment, and that the Swedish model still
contains relevant characteristics for other European countries. Active labour
market policy is a way out of the unemployment trap. The active labour
market policy may serve as an alternative for deregulation in order to augment
the flexibility of the labour market.
1. Introduction
By tbe 1970s, supply-side theory had become something of a new economic
orthodoxy. From the supply-side perspective, labour market inflexibility
explains mass unemployment. In this context the presumably greater
flexibility of the labour market in the USA was seen as an explanation of its
superior employment record relative to European economies. Many
European employers' organizations and public authorities came to believe,
in fact, that flexibility and deregulation are a useful weapon in the fight
against unemployment. Although many have adopted policies in this
direction, unemployment rates in Europe seem to have stabilized at a high
level. Unlike most European countries, Sweden, which is highly regulated,
does reasonably well in employment terms. The country seems to be in an
enviable position. In addition to the low unemployment rate, another
'Department of Applied Economics, Nijmegen University, the Netherlands
* 'Department of Economics, University of Limburg, the Netherlands84 British Journal of Industrial Relations
remarkable aspect of employment in Sweden is the high labour force
participation rate. Recently, however, the 'Swedish model' has been the
subject of debate both inside and outside Sweden. Inflation has risen and
economic growth and the balance of payments have deteriorated. This has
led to discussion about the stability of the system. The paper goes into this
debate. The central question addressed is: What can be learned from the
Swedish experience by other European countries suffering from high (long-
term) unemployment?
The paper is organized as follows. First, the main characteristics of the
Swedish model are outlined. Next, some major outcomes that have been
achieved are presented and compared with those in other European
countries. In the final section, the relevance of (parts of) the Swedish model
for other European countries is examined.
2. The main characteristics of the Swedish model
The term 'Swedish model' has some very different connotations (Meidner
1990). It sometimes refers to the fact that the Swedish economy is a cross
between a market economy and a state-regulated economy, a combination
of private ownership in the production sphere and collectivization of
consumption, a highly centralized wage policy with powerful confederations
of unions and employers' organizations as the main agents, based on the
principle of solidarity. Another way to define the Swedish model is to take as
a starting-point its two dominant goals: full employment and equality. The
highly developed labour market policy and the exceptionally large public
sector in Sweden resulted from the commitment to these goals. In a narrow
sense, the Swedish model can be seen as a mode! for combining full
employment and price stability by a restrictive general economic policy
complemented by selective measures for maintaining high employment and
investments. Others refer to the Swedish model as a negotiation/consensus
model in the labour market. Following Ahlen (1989: 331), we define the
'Swedish model' as a combination of an unusual labour relations system with
a sophisticated bargaining approach founded on macroeconomic concerns.
Sweden has a high rate of unionization and employer organization. It
probably has the highest (overall) unionization rate in the world (80-85 per
cent). During the first two postwar decades, the main players in the Swedish
model (apart from the government) were the Swedish Trade Union
Confederation (LO),' the largest employees' organization (primarily blue-
collar) and the Swedish Employers' Confederation (SAF), the main
employers' organization in the private sector. The LO represents some 90
per cent of the blue-collar workers and the SAF represents about 42,000
firms in the private industry, including all of the largest firms. In the 1970s,
with the expansion of (public-sector) services, came the rise in prominence
of public-sector and white-collar unions, and the dominance of the LO-
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was the largest union in the LO (Ahlen 1989: 331-2). The Central
Organization of Salaried Employees (TCO) is the largest central white-
collar workers' organization, representing about 75 per cent of white-collar
workers in both private and public sectors.
The Swedish model is based on the first basic agreement signed by the LO
and SAF in 1938, but has, in fact, its original roots in the 'December
compromise' of 1906 between the SAF and LO.^ The Saltsjobaden
Agreement of 1938 later laid down procedures for negotiations between
employees' and employers' organizations and placed restrictions on indust-
rial action. It constituted the cornerstone of the centralized Swedish model
in which strong national organizations negotiated freely without govern-
ment intervention and assumed responsibility for keeping wages within the
limits of macroeconomic balance. Most problems between labour and
management were resolved through negotiations and agreements. As a
result, there were relatively few laws governing conditions on the labour
market until the late 1970s.
The Swedish model was developed by G. Rehn and R. Meidner, two
economists associated with the LO. Their main proposition was that 'labour
market policy should no longer be simply a matter of establishing labour
exchanges to bring together the unemployed and unfilled jobs, and paying
unemployment benefits to those without a job. Instead it should be
developed into a preventive policy instrument, part of an integrated model
of economic, pay and labour market policy' (EIRR 1990: no. 193). In the
1950s and the 1960s these ideas were adopted by the LO and by the ruling
Social Democratic Party (SAP). The aims of this integrated model were full
employment, price stability, economic growth and a fair distribution of
wages. Instead of the traditional measures used by Keynesian-oriented
policy-makers, they made a plea for an active labour market policy in order
to reach these goals. In the original outline a central point was that the
responsibility for full employment and economic stability should rest with
the government while the unions, together with the employers' organiza-
tions, should be responsible for the process of wage formation. Below we
summarize the main characteristics of this Rehn-Meidner model and those
added in the course of time (Economist 1990: 5-6; EIRR 1990: no. 193;
Standing 1988).
Centralized Wage Bargaining
Sweden has traditionally been regarded as having one of the most
centralized systems of wage bargaining among OECD countries. It was
believed that centralized bargaining could deliver a lower aggregate wage
increase in line with what the economy could afford. Swedish unions
supported this centralized wage bargaining process because it facilitated the
policy of wage solidarity (see following subsection). Swedish employers
were also in favour of central bargaining, since they believed it would
prevent wage inflation and guarantee peace. In fact, they were the driving86 British Journal of Industrial Relations
force behind the first central negotiations, which resulted in a settlement in
1952. At central level, negotiations resulted in framework agreements,
which set the level of wage cost increases (i.e. total costs for the factor
labour, thus not only wages but also payroll taxes, overtime work, etc., and
costs of improvement of working conditions or working time reduction) to
be granted. Next, the framework agreements were supplemented by
industry contracts which specified how the centrally agreed arrangements
were to be allocated among employers. Most collective bargaining contracts
in Sweden were based on agreements between the SAF and LO or PTK
(Bargaining Cartel of Salaried Employees in Industry and Services), and
between their counterparts in the national and local government sectors.
Finally, companies negotiated with local branches of the unions about the
terms as applied to the individual. Throughout the duration of the central
contract (1-3 years), the parties pledged to respect the peace obligation,
which debarred them from resorting to industrial action to settle disputes
over matters regulated in the agreement. In the 1980s, however, centralized
wage bargaining came under increasing pressure and eventually broke
down.
Throughout the postwar period, the labour market in Sweden has been
well known as highly stable and harmonious in comparison with most other
European countries. Few working days have been lost because of disputes.
However, after the 1980 conflict the Swedish industrial relations model has
been the subject of a growing debate. In 1983 the Engineering Employers'
Association (VF) signed a separate agreement with the Metal Workers'
Union. This impetus for change came from the employers' side. It was the
SAF which, in line with the government's wishes, insisted on centralized
bargaining in the 1950s, but it was the VF, the leading member association in
the SAF, that signalled the break in 1983. The LO and SAF agreed that
there would be no centralized negotiations in 1984 (for the first time since
1956). In 1985 and 1986 there was again strong pressure for industry-level
bargaining. The 1985 LO-S AF agreement was only a recommendation. In
the 1988 bargaining round, full decentralization returned. The LO's role
was reduced to co-ordinating genera! demands and holding weekly meetings
during negotiations to discuss strategies. The demands for decentralized
negotiations came chiefly from industries such as metalworking, which had a
large export propensity and were highly dependent on the international
market. The need to restructure to remain competitive, as well as the
current high profits in many of these firms, have created the need to adjust
remuneration to fit market conditions, while encouraging greater produc-
tivity. There has always been a sizeable element of wage drift, but in recent
years wage drift accounted for more than half of the total wage increase. In
addition, the LO and SAF failed once again to agree on a national norm in
1990, with the unions refusing to restrain wage claims despite the deter-
iorating economic situation. Until the current phase of labour shortages and
high profits ends, which is unlikely for some time, the likelihood of a return
to totally centralized negotiations seems small (Ahl^n 1989: 334-5). Even ifThe Swedish Model: Relevant for Other European Countries? 87
the 1991 bargaining round leads towards a central agreement providing for
moderate pay rises, they will be undermined by correspondingly higher
wage drift. However, decentralized wage bargaining, advocated by the
employers, may backfire and create an even bigger upward pressure on
wages, as recent bargaining results show. Wage drift has reached record
levels in 1990 (see EIRR1990: nos. 200,203). The unemployment-inflation
dilemma has turned out to be the most vulnerable part of the Swedish
model. It is not only the employers' new wage policy that confounds wage
solidarity: it is also the unions' inner tensions that need resolving (Ahlen
1989: 344).
'Solidaristic' Wage Policy
The framework agreements determined the room for wage cost increases.
With regard to wages, the wage policy of solidarity played an important role.
According to this policy, all employees should receive equal pay for equal
work, regardless of the particular financial position of their employer. The
inter-industry and inter-enterprise link between productivity and wages
should be broken, and this should produce a more equitable distribution of
wages. Gradually wage rate differentials should disappear among in-
dustries, enterprises, regions, sexes and age groups. However, as it has
worked out in practice, there have been some other consequences as well.
Less profitable companies were unable to pay these wages and were forced
to reduce their work-forces or go out of business altogether. More profitable
firms were paying wages below the level that they could actually afford.
They could not attract additional labour by paying higher wages, and wage
cost inflation was supposed to be avoided; the excess profits could be used
for new investments. Although small wage differentials could inhibit labour
mobility, the model's architects argued that in their model narrow wage
differentials would actually stimulate mobility. The model has been
perceived as a way of accelerating structural adjustment and economic
growth. The solidaristic wage policy harmed low-productivity sectors by
raising the relative wages of workers in these sectors and favoured high-
productivity ones by holding back wage growth and speeding up the transfer
of employment from old labour-intensive sectors to modem, technologically
advanced, capital-intensive sectors. The solidaristic wage policy presup-
posed a co-ordination of wage negotiations not only between the LO-
affiliated unions but also between the LO and the white-collar confedera-
tions.
In the 1980s profit-sharing, productivity-based deals and employee
'convertible loans' have undermined the solidaristic wage policy. Consider-
able wage drift and profit-sharing schemes are the alternatives for profitable
companies to use their high capacity to let their employees share in the firms'
profits—both alternatives running counter to the solidaristic wage policy. It
is obvious that these consequences of the Swedish wage policy so far have
remained unsolved (Meidner 1990:89). Even more important in this respect88 British Journal of Industrial Relations
have been the local wage negotiations, which tend to restore wage
differentials. Centralized bargaining and the solidaristic wage policy are
mutually dependent. However, the LO has now proposed a somewhat
modified wage solidarity policy. The guiding principle is to be 'equal pay for
equal work: different pay for different work', and thus establishes that some
pay differentials are fair (Ahlen 1989: 343).
Active Labour Market Policy
With centrahzed wage bargaining and a solidaristic wage policy, a special
kind of dynamics arose in the economy, viz. a combination of a large demand
for and a large supply of labour. Because demand stemmed from high-
productivity sectors and supply emanated from low-productivity sectors,
matching problems on the labour market could easily occur. To tackle this
problem, an active labour market policy was developed. This policy aims at
enhancing the mobility of workers who lose their jobs, without relying
totally on the price mechanism. It is supposed to perform the role of wage
differentials in balancing labour supply and demand and in achieving full
employment. A great variety of measures have been developed under the
heading of 'active labour market policy', e.g. relocation grants, training or
retraining programmes, temporary public-sector schemes and private-
sector recruitment subsidies intended to create jobs (Johannesson 1989).
This policy stemmed from the idea that the longer people are inactive in the
labour market, the more difficult it is to get them back to work. The Swedish
model is characterized by the 'right to work' model instead of the 'right to
income' model. Another effect of the model is that the workers would, at
least theoretically, find new employment in more viable enterprises and
sectors, and higher employment and wage levels would thus be attained in
the longer run.
The Swedish model is best known for its active labour market policy.
There is one budget for all measures, and the policy is co-ordinated by the
National Labour Market Board (AMP), in which employers' organizations,
employees' organizations and government participate. Such an approach
guarantees a strong interdependency of all measures. Unemployment is
dealt with as follows. First, the labour exchange tries to find a job. It
operates with case-loads of 15—30 unemployed persons per member of staff,
compared with, for example 375 in Britain, 370 in West Germany and 160 in
the Netherlands. Unlike most European countries, in Sweden ail vacancies
and planned lay-offs have to be notified to the employment service, so that it
has a thorough understanding of the local labour market.^ If the labour
exchange cannot find a job, a training programme is often organized. Where
workers are declared redundant, hard-to-place workers are sent on high-
quality training courses — even before they become unemployed in some
cases.'' Thus, economic change is welcomed as an opportunity to provide
experienced workers for the industries of the future. If workers have not
been placed within six months, employers recruiting them are offered a 50The Swedish Model: Relevant for Other European Countries? 89
per cent wage subsidy over a six-month period. If this programme does not
get them a job, workers are entitled to unemployment benefits. These
benefits are not open-ended, but are paid for a maximum of 300 days and
are subject to a strict work test to discourage scroungers. If a recipient
refuses to take a training place or a job, benefits may be stopped immedi-
ately.
Sweden has one of the most generous unemployment benefit systems in
the world. However, it has also strict eligibility rules. If all these measures
fail, the public sector (mainly local authorities) acts as the employer of last
resort. It provides work for up to six months, mostly in construction or the
caring services. Anyone whose benefit entitlement has run out is entitled to
such work by law. This approach contrasts sharply with other European
countries (De Neubourg and Caanen 1988: 87; EIRR 1990: no. 193;
Layard 1989: 17-18). Sweden, however, is no soft touch for the jobless. A
vital ingredient of Sweden's success is that it combines the carrot — the
promise of training or a job — with a stick.
A Restrictive Fiscal Policy
Centralized wage bargaining with a solidaristic wage policy and active
labour market policy kept unemployment low and aggregate demand high
in the economy; thus, the danger of inflation could be round the corner.
Therefore another element of the Swedish model is a restrictive fiscal
policy. Budget disequilibria were adjusted in the short term. The Swedish
model was known for the high tax rates. (Personal income tax had a top
rate of 72 per cent, the corporate tax was 57 per cent.) Moreover,
progressive taxation was essential to finance the Swedish 'welfare capital-
ism', implying a large and growing public sector. In the model, economic
growth and investment were to be left to private enterprises. In essence,
the model was based on the assumption that, whereas individual firms
could be efficient, the market system itself would not be. Although profits
were heavily taxed, 'excess' profits put into special 'investment funds' or
'renewal funds' were not taxed, channelling company profits into regional
investment, investment in the education and training of workers, or new
technology.
Policy of Selective Economic Growth
As can be deduced from the foregoing points, the Swedish model corrected
the results of the free market system. Apart from the points already
mentioned, a policy of selective economic growth is used. This policy
aimed at the development of subordinated regions and provisions of goods
that would otherwise not be supplied in sufficient amounts (socially neces-
sary services).90 British Journal of Industrial Relations
Scandinavian Inflation Model
The original Rehn-Meidner model was incomplete, in so far as there was no
mechanism for determining the level or rate of change of prices or wages.
The Scandinavian inflation model was a policy guideline for collective
bargaining. The production process was divided into an 'exposed', export-
oriented tradable goods sector and a 'sheltered', domestic goods sector.
Wages in the exposed sector were supposedly set by reference to its
productivity growth and internationally determined price increases. The
exposed sector acted as a wage leader for the wages in the sheltered sector,
with prices being determined as a mark-up on unit labour costs (Standing
1988: 46-7).
The realism and practical application of the Scandinavian inflation model
were undermined during the 1970s by the emergence of the public sector as
the new wage leader. Public-sector jobs expanded to include over 35 per
cent of the work-force. In 1987 this model was reformulated by the LO,
TCO and SAF. The new model adds adjustments for international
economic factors and the previous model had failed to take into account
(factors that affect competitiveness, such as changes in the rate of exchange
or in the value of the dollar). The thesis was that the trend towards
decentralization had to be reversed, because the system's stability depends
on centralized wage bargaining that can permit macro wage flexibility.
According to the new model, the economy is divided into three sectors,
called 'competitive', 'private sheltered' and 'public sheltered'. It specified
that bargaining results of the largest industries in the international tradable
goods sector should determine pay increases in the rest of the economy and
that pay developments in the tradable goods sector should be determined by
productivity growth and international price developments in that sector. In
this way, pay developments could be kept within the limits the country could
afford. TTie model continues the tradition of sophisticated labour market
thinking, but like its predecessor has little practical utility. Locally produced
wage drift remains an intractable problem (Ahlen 1989; Standing 1988:
126-7).
Wage-earner Funds
The wage-earner funds can be seen as an extension of the solidaristic wage
policy. As a consequence of the latter, large profitable companies were
gaining extra profits. In 1976 the LO Congress adopted Meidners' proposal
for wage-earner funds, to be financed by these extra profits which arose as a
result of employees refraining from claiming higher wages in accordance
with the principles of solidaristic wage policy. The basic idea was that the
capital should remain within the firms but the ownership should successively
be transferred to the employees as a collective. Collective profit-sharing was
seen as a means of making wage restraint more acceptable to workers who
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wages. In December 1983 Parliament passed the Employment Investment
Fund Bill. Five regional wage-earner fimds of very limited size were
introduced in 1984. The employers still strongly resist these funds. SAF
maintains that profit-sharing by the individual is to be preferred. The non-
socialist parties have said they will repeal the legislation once their
government returns to office (Peterson, 1987; Standing 1988:139-43).
3. What has been achieved
Full Employment
Unemployment remains high in many European countries. In Sweden the
unemployment rate is well below that of other countries (see Table 1).
During the second half of the 1970s it was about 2 per cent; it peaked in 1983
(2.9 per cent), was a mere 1.4 per cent in 1989, and is currently running at
about 2 per cent. However, skill shortages rose sharply during 1988,
reaching their highest level since 1970 (OECD 1989a: 21). The
employment-population ratio may serve as an indicator for the utilization of
labour resources. This ratio in Sweden, already the highest in the world, has
continued to grow, while it has fallen in all the main EC countries (Layard
1989:19). Sweden probably has the highest rate of labour force participation
(82.6 per cent in 1988) among major industrial countries. Furthermore, the
female labour force participation rate is very high (80.3 per cent in 1988).
However, when the hours actually worked are taken into account, the
utilization rate in Sweden is only a little higher than that of Canada or the
USA. This is caused by two factors: (1) Swedish workers are, more often
than other workers, 'with a job but not at work'; and (2) there are more
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part-time workers in Sweden (de Neubourg 1988:99). Sickness absenteeism
amounts to more than 13 per cent for blue-collar workers and about 6 per
cent for white-collar workers. In addition, absenteeism caused by parental
leave and training must be added.
In spite of the need to improve the adaptability and efficiency of the
Swedish labour market, the composition of labour market policy up to 1987
did not give the impression that more emphasis was being put on
supply-side-oriented measures. During the 1970s there was a rapid increase
in demand-oriented measures* (Johannesson 1989). New subsidies were
provided to companies to help keep workers in employment; these included
financial assistance for stockpiling, in-plant training and temporary employ-
ment subsidies. In 1982, with the return to government of the Social
Democrats, there was a move towards serving the needs of employers
directly. A new emphasis was put on 'placement efficiency', that is on a
strengthening of employment offices to help fill job vacancies in companies
quickly and efficiently. Practice shows that such an approach is effective. It
reduces the duration of unfilled vacancies as well as the likelihood of
mismatch placements that lead to subsequent unemployment (Schroder
1989; Standing 1988). In order to counteract rapidly increasing unemploy-
ment, a number of labour market policy measures were implemented. From
the end of 1982, the number of temporary jobs (relief work) increased; in
particular, there was a targeting on youth and disabled workers. For other
displaced workers, unemployment benefits had become more significant.
Standing (1988: 103) concludes that during the 1970s there was a slow
erosion of the 'right to work' principle and a shift towards the 'right to
income' principle. This continued into the 1980s, despite strong efforts to
reverse the trend.
Sweden's success in achieving full employment and a high level of labour
force participation has been due in large measure to its active labour market
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'Employment services and administration, labour market training (adults), special youth
measures, direct job creation and employment subsidies and measures for the disabled.
•'Unemployment compensation and early retirement for labour market reasons.
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policy. Also, the tax structure encourages high (part-time) female labour
force participation, in that married women working part-time are treated
most favourably (OECD 1990b: 163-9). Other facilities, like part-time
parental leave, child care and part-time early retirement, also contribute to
the high female labour force participation rate (Delsen 1990a, b).
The special characteristic of Swedish labour market policies as compared
with those of other European countries is not the size of the total
expenditures, but their composition. Despite the fact that Sweden's overall
budget is no higher than that of other European states, the share of active
labour market policy in total labour market expenditures is around 70 per
cent. Around 30 per cent is spent on unemployment benefits. In most
European countries this division of expenditures is reversed (see Table 2).*
It has been claimed that Sweden is thus investing in competence, while other
countries are investing i" unemployment (EIRR 1990: no. 193).
Long-term Unemployment
From the beginning of 1984, efforts have been made to increase measures
designed to counteract long-term unemployment and youth unemployment
and thereby limit the need for relief work and unemployment benefits (see
Johannesson 1989). A new recruitment grant has been introduced, aiming at
facilitating recruitment in the manufacturing industry. In January 1984 the
government also introduced the Youth Team Act for 18-19-year-olds who
register as unemployed. This guarantees a public-sector job for four hours a
day. In principle, the right to a youth team job replaces the right to
unemployment benefits. The tendency to direct measures to the long-term
unemployed was accentuated when a recruitment grant for employment by
county and municipal councils was introduced in January 1985. The
reorientation of the labour market policies towards the long-term un-
employed also entailed giving preference to the long-term unemployed in
placement in ordinary policy measures. Furthermore, special programmes
and efforts for the long-term unemployed were introduced, such as
individual follow-up and counselling, job clubs aimed at strengthening self-
confidence , motivation and job search, co-operation with local trade unions,
etc.
Some critics argue that the active labour market policy is just unemploy-
ment in disguise. However, even if all those on such schemes are included,
the total jobless rate is just over 5 per cent — still below that of most
European countries. In 1988, 3.7 per cent of the Swedish labour force was
involved in labour market programmes (Bourdet and Persson 1989). Yet
this misses the real point of the measures, namely to keep the unemployed in
touch with the labour market, to improve their chances of employment and
to prevent long-term joblessness. In 1988 only about 8 per cent of Sweden's
unemployed were jobless for more than a year, compared with 50 per cent
on average in EC countries, (see Table 1). The hysteresis effect is thereby
also counteracted.^ Effects of human capital losses and signalling are94 British Journal of Industrial Relations
minimized. The differences in unemployment rates mainly reflect
differences in the duration of unemployment, rather than in the proportion
of people who become unemployed. Since 1979 unemployment in the EC
countries has grown mainly because of the rise in duration, rather than a rise
in inflow (Bourdet and Persson 1989; Layard 1989).
Economic Growth and Inflation
Sweden's economic situation, like that of a number of other Western
European countries, worsened after the oil crises of 1973 and 1979.
Subsidies were pumped into industry (e.g. state-financed inventory building
in the shipbuilding and steel sectors) and public-sector projects were
expanded. (The local government's service sector was opened up for relief
work in the 1970s.) The results were predictable: the budget and external
current account went deep into deficit, and infiation rose. In 1982 the re-
elected socialist government adopted the so-called 'third way': export-led
economic growth, linked to price and income moderation. The defensive
industrial policy was abolished in order to reduce the budget deficit. Also in
1982 the krona was devaluated by 16 per cent, and the budget deficit of 13
per cent in 1982 turned into a surplus of 1 per cent in 1988; exports boomed
and unemployment and inflation fell. However, by 1988 relative unit labour
costs were more or less at the level observed before the 1982 devaluation.
High domestic wage increases were the main cause for this trend (OECD
1989b: 14). Moreover, since 1985 GDP has grown by an average of 2.3 per
cent, well below the OECD average of 3.5 per cent. The growth figures for
1990 and the forecast for 1991 for Sweden are 0.7 and 0.1 per cent compared
with 2.9 and 2.8 per cent for the OECD Europe. The change in
compensation per employee as well as in unit labour costs in Sweden in the
period 1987-91 is higher than in OECD Europe. Given these figures, it is
not surprising that employment growth in Sweden is slower than for OECD
Europe. Only with regard to the (standardized) unemployment rate does
Sweden perform better than other OECD countries, and this picture does
not change in the period 1987-9. It would be interesting to know whether
these changes can be attributed to changes in Swedish industrial relations or
to the aftermath of the Swedish model as it functioned until the early 1980s.
It is certain that the changes occurred in a period of declining consensus and
decentralization in wage bargaining.
Large wage increases and sluggish productivity growth have pushed up
inflation and ended industry's international competitiveness. Swedish
industry now invests more abroad than in Sweden, a tendency that
undermines the selective economic growth policy, which relies on profitable
companies investing in Sweden. The reasons given for this flight of capital
out of the country include a need to move nearer to other markets, rising
labour costs, labour shortages, high rates of absenteeism and the taxation
system (EIRR 1990: no. 193; Economist 1990). Sweden's current account
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devaluation of 1982 brought only temporary relief and concealed low
productivity and high production costs. Therefore a new devaluation is not
deemed desirable, and a more structural approach is now thought necessary.
A labour market policy to increase and improve labour supply could in our
view be a part of such a structural approach, which fits well into the Swedish
model. For instance, the recently proposed entitlement to at least two
weeks' vocational training per year for employees and lower marginal
income tax rates could be applied to improve the quality of the labour force,
and later retirement could be applied to increase labour supply.
Absenteeism through illness couJd be reduced by making employers more
responsible for paying sickness benefits to the workers and by linking the
employer's contribution to the sickness benefit fund and the level of sick
leave in his enterprise. Better rehabilitation and measures to reduce
absenteeism through improvements in working conditions could stimulate
labour supply and promote labour mobility.
Swedish infiation has been higher than the OECD average inflation rate
for some time. These differences in inflation rates are especially noticeable
inthesecondhalf of the 1980s. The 1978-87 average infiation rate in Sweden
was 8.3 per cent against 6.3 per cent for the OECD countries. Sweden did
not fully succeed in dampening inflation as many other OECD countries did
in the early 1980s and this certainly holds for the second half of the 1980s.
The average inflation rate in 1988-90 in Sweden was 8.2 per cent, compared
with 4.1 per cent for the OECD. However, Sweden has undoubtedly
achieved a better trade-off between unemployment and infiation (Phillips
curve) than most countries, thanks to its active labour market policy
(OECD 1989b: 55-6). Despite the rise in unemployment, inflation in
Sweden is expected to rise to 10 per cent in 1991. This suggests a shift in the
Phillips curve.
Labour Market Flexibility
The Swedish labour market shows a significant amount of flexibility. The
relationship between the unemployment rate and the vacancy rate (Bev-
eridge curve) is often used as an indicator of the degree of labour market
flexibility. In most European OECD countries, the Beveridge curve has
shifted outward in the last two decades, indicating a rising mismatch
between labour demand and supply. In Sweden, this relationship has
remained broadly unchanged. Compared internationally, the non-acceler-
ating inflationary rate of unemployment (NAIRU), long-term unemploy-
ment and youth unemployment are low and part-time employment is high.
Moreover, real-wage rigidity is low and mobility patterns seem favourable
(Johannesson 1989; OECD 1989b; Standing 1988: 52-6). Labour mobility
has two dimensions: employment mobility and job mobility. Employment
mobihty refers to internal mobility, involving no change in employment. Job
mobility refers to external mobility, the move from one enterprise to
another. In Sweden internal or functional flexibility has replaced external or96 British Journal of Industrial Relations
numerical flexibility. Training is seen as the top priority by all enterprises,
government programmes, employers' organizations and unions. In other
European countries the lack of functional flexibility is compensated by more
external numerical flexibility. It is the latter that is stressed by the supply-
side economists in their proposal for deregulation and greater flexibility.
However, research in the Federal Republic of Germany and France shows
that the reduction in employment protection by means of increasing the
opportunities for temporary contracts does not result in more employment.
Further, the net employment effect of the special government temporary
employment programmes in Europe is also limited. They merely result in
redistribution of unemployment and a shift in the recruitment pattern in the
direction of subsidized temporary jobs. Moreover, the countries that have
gone the furthest with short-term flexibility may run greater risk that
employers will not pay sufficient attention to the source of their long-term
flexibility and efficiency, i.e. to manpower training (Delsen 1990b).
In Sweden long-term unemployment is avoided and the hysteresis effect is
reduced by means of an active labour market policy. This includes the
development of training programmes with compulsory participation and job
guarantees, whereby the government acts as an employer of last resort.
Finite unemployment benefits and vacancy registration cover these
measures. In 1988 about 70 per cent of all unemployed receiving training
found a job within six months. It appears also that after training most
individuals were able to command higher wages (OECD 1989b: 82).
Pay Differentials
The LO's primary objective has been to reduce pay differentials between
various groups in the labour market. Wage differentials in Sweden are the
lowest in the OECD area (Freeman 1988). A certain degree of equalization
has been achieved, despite the fact that market forces were detrimental to
the goal. The wage solidarity policy has also been important in reducing pay
differentials between men and women. Nevertheless, the gap is still wide.
Recent trends towards more decentralized collective bargaining have been
accompanied by a worsening of women's relative pay position. It tends to
restore wage differentials. The Swedish labour market is more segregated
along gender lines than most other European countries. Women tend to
work in a small number of (part-time) jobs, principally in social services or
unskilled manufacturing, while men are found in all categories of employ-
ment (EIRR 1990: no. 193).
As a consequence of the solidaristic wage policy, the link between
profitability and wage levels would be broken and smaller wage differentials
would stimulate mobility. The relationship between value added per
employee and the percentage of employed (Salter curve) for the Swedish
manufacturing sector indeed indicates that the wage profile is independent
of profitability, and only a small fraction of employment takes place in firms
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moreover, shows that the narrowing of wage differentials between in-
dustries has contributed to the structural adjustment of Swedish industry,
e.g. the car and textile industry. The narrowing of wage differentials has also
encouraged the growing concentration of employment in large, innovative,
relatively profitable companies and has impeded the emergence or growth of
small firms, which are a source of employment growth in the longer run
(Standing 1988: 50-1).
Legislation
In the early 1970s, the trade unions were forced to conclude that certain
issues of importance to them could not be resolved by means of direct
contract negotiations with the SAF. The unions asked the government and
Parliament to pass legislation to bring about improvements in areas such as
job security and employee participation in decision-making. These trade
union demands resulted in a number of new laws. The most important was
the Act on Employee Participation in Decision-making (MBL), which came
into force in 1977. This law required employers to negotiate not only in the
area of social affairs but in all major changes in working conditions,
including questions of what to produce and how production should be
organized. Employers have to give the union access to almost all of the
company's economic information. However, the extensive union rights
were used primarily to negotiate employment levels and the timing of
dismissals (Slomp 1990: 162). The law became operational through a so-
called Development Agreement. The signing of the Development Agree-
ment between the SAF and LO/PTK in April 1982 meant that MBL
regulations had been implemented in all of Sweden's collective bargaining
sectore. In the Development Agreement the SAF gained acceptance from
the LO and PTK that the law would be implemented at company level.
4. The Swedish model: relevant for other countries?
The Swedish Model in Discussion
The Swedish model has recently been the subject of more critical scrutiny.
High inflation, current account deficits and high capital exports seem to be
the most important problems. In 1990, strikes and a rejection of the
proposed economic policy resulted in the resignation of the Social Demo-
cratic government. The recent problems shed new light on the question
whether the Swedish model can or should be exported. Meidner and Rehn
state that the recent problems do not represent the failure of the model, but
only the failure of a modified version of the model (EIRR 1990: no. 195).
The main modifications are a decentralization of wage negotiations, general
as opposed to selective expansionist programmes, absence of fiscal restraints
and absence of solidaristic wage policy. However, it is also argued that the98 British Journal of Industrial Relations
problems show the failure and the imminent end of this model. Supply-side
rigidities and the fixing of unemployment below the NAIRU are respons-
ible (Peterson 1987; Economist 1990). According to this view, the Swedish
economy can recover only when taxes are reduced* and government
expenditure is decreased in order to improve the supply side of the
economy. Moreover, decentralization of wage determination and an
increase in wage dispersion would improve the quality of labour via wage
competition, and an increase in unemployment is needed to take the heat
out of the Swedish economy. The adoption of these supply-side policy
options will greatly influence the basic features of the Swedish model. An
increase in unemployment will influence the active labour market policy,
notably the 'right to work' principle. Decentralization of wage bargaining
endangers both the solidaristic wage policy and the active labour market
policy. In evaluating Swedish industrial relations, it should be borne in mind
that the Swedish approach follows from a view on unemployment:
There is no Swedish model that can be accepted or rejected, bought or sold.
There is simply an approach — founded on dedicated innovative hard work.
Unemployment is in itself a burden on society, and a cost. It represents a valuable
productioti capacity that is wasted. No country is rich enough to afford
unemployment. (Jonzon 1989:13).
An increase in unemployment does not comply with such a view.
Corporatism and Economic Performance
The debate on the Swedish model fits into the discussion on the relationship
between corporatism^ and economic performance which has been the
subject of much research and consideration in the 1980s (Calmfors and
Driffill 1988; Calmfors and Nymoen 1990; Freeman 1988; Jackman et al.
1990; OECD 1989b). The results are ambiguous, but point in the direction
of a hump-shaped relationship (Calmfors and Driffill 1988). This implies
that both highly centralized and highly decentrahzed labour market
arrangements give better economic performance (i.e. with regard to real-
wage flexibility, unemployment and inflation) than intermediate cases.
Despite the poor theoretical basis and the consequently poor measurement
of corporatism, empirical results seem to be in favour of a positive
relationship between corporatism and macroeconomic performance. This
implies that the path towards decentralization may lead to a deterioration in
Sweden's economic performance.
The most striking results of the Swedish model concern long-term
unemployment. Evidence with regard to OECD countries is provided by
Layard (1989). He shows that half of the OECD unemployed have been out
of work for over a year; the figure for Sweden is only 8.2 per cent. Layard
concludes that three elements seem to be important in fighting long-term
unemployment: finite benefits, active labour market policy, and centralized
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(1990) and Jackman et al. (1990). From these analyses it follows that,
whereas the 'right to income' policy has led to increasing long-term
unemployment, the 'right to work' principle has improved the supply side of
the economy. Another conclusion is that it is not the level but the duration of
unemployment benefits that influences economic behaviour, and this
supports the idea of finite benefits as applied in Sweden.
In our view, the Swedish experience with active labour market policy
shows that the high rate of long-term unemployment in parts of the OECD
is avoidable. One may wonder why the 'benefit principle' dominates. There
is little to recommend the payment of social security benefits without job
opportunities. Passive labour market policies create a labour reserve that
cannot be used when necessary. It does not help in relieving either
quantitative or qualitative discrepancies on the labour market. Moreover,
empirical data on expenditure on labour market policies show that, in
countries where employment services are organized around the 'employ-
ment' principle (as in Sweden, Austria, Denmark), unemployment is lower
(Jackmane/c/. 1990). In Sweden, part ofthe active labour market measures
can be classified as supply-side activities enhancing labour market flexi-
bility.^'' We agree with Layard (1989) that it is worth while for countries to
follow Swedish thinking when allocating expenditure on labour market
programmes (see Table 2). However, this kind of labour market policy has
one drawback, as has been made clear by a recent contribution of Calmfors
and Nymoen (1990). They state that, if inflow into labour market program-
mes and inflow into unemployment are not regarded as perfect substitutes
by unions and individuals (and if participation in labour market programmes
is preferred to unemployment), wage adjustments might slow down. Active
labour market policy acts as a cushion to relieve the consequences of too
high wages and consequently provides insufficient incentives for the unions
to adjust wage demands. One of their conclusions makes this point clear:
'Our most controversial finding is that accommodative labour market
policies, designed to reduce open unemployment, raise real wages' (p. 431).
This result confirms their statement that labour market programmes and
open unemployment are not substitutes, and it has important implications
for labour market policy. Wage moderation can be seriously hampered by
the Swedish approach to unemployment. The results of Calmfors and
Nymoen relate to labour market policies in Sweden, Denmark and Finland,
while this result could not be found for Norway.
Adjustments to labour market disequilibria are not, of course, the only
indicators of economic performance. For the Swedish system to be viable,
long-term developments are important. Calmfors and Driffill (1988) dis-
tinguish between centralized economies (e.g. Sweden), intermediate
economies and decentralized economies. They show that for 1974-85 both
the level and change in the Okun misery index and an alternative
performance index for Sweden are lower than the average for the other
t3^es of economies. ^^ From Freeman (1988) it follows that Sweden is ranked
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GDP during 1973-84. Swedish performance is about the same as that of
Germany, Denmark or France. Because ofthe large growth in employment,
real GDP growth per worker is of course less (coming 15th) but real GDP
growth has been twice as high as in the USA, while, regarding the level of
GDP per worker, Sweden is ranked as 8th. Calmfors and Nymoen (1990)
report a productivity growth for Sweden that shows about the same picture
as for Western Europe during 1967-87. From their steady-state wage
equations it can be concluded that, ofthe Nordic countries, wages in Sweden
are the most responsive to unemployment. These results indicate that long-
term economic performance in Sweden gives no reason to place any doubt
about the viability of the model. However, as we have described in Section
3, this viability depends for a large part on the way corporatism is given
shape, i.e. on the way consensus is reached and wages are set. Note that the
majority of the research covers 1970-85, while the main problems on which
the criticism ofthe model is based showed up after 1983-5.
The Swedish Approach and the Wage-setting Process
For the Swedish mode! to be effective, consensus is a conditioniiwe qua non.
This point is much stressed in the literature (Albeda 1991; Calmfors and
Driffill 1988; Elvander 1989; Layard 1989). Albeda (1991) mentions three
elements that are characteristic of Swedish labour relations. First, he states,
in Sweden there is little polarization and the Social Democrats have been in
government since 1932. Only in 1976-82 was there a non-socialist govern-
ment. Second, Sweden has a very high level of organization on both sides of
the labour market. Third, there is (close) co-operation between the trade
unions and the Social Democratic Party. Thus, Albeda concludes, this
'neo-corporatist' society is very manageable and Sweden is a country with a
consensus. In the Swedish model labour market parties not only negotiate
about wages, but also make arrangements about employment measures and
incomes policy measures. Centralized bargaining seems the only way to
reach a workable agreement in such a case. Without some kind of
centralized bargaining, active labour market policy would be difficult to
implement. With decentralized bargaining, parties may assume that other
sectors in the economy will take care of prevailing unemployment. They
may simply shift the unemployment problem on to the rest of the economy.
No sector will make enough room for schooling and job guarantees, shifting
the problems on to the government. Moreover, decentralized wage
bargaining may also cause problems in a tight labour market, e.g. a wage-
price spiral. Central bargaining is a means to internalize the externality that
exists when, under decentralized bargaining, the parties ignore the effects of
their actions on others.
Evidence from several countries, including the Netherlands (Albeda
1991) and the Nordic countries (Elvander 1989), shows that centralized
\i^%t deletnvmatvoTV Is difficult lo anange and mamtain. The Swedish LO
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central bargaining. For centralized bargaining to work well, wages must be
set by the sector that is exposed to international competition (cf. Section 2),
and then the rest of the economy must keep in line. However, in Sweden
wage leadership was partly shifted to the public sector. In this environment,
centralized bargaining is flawed. The Scandinavian model for setting general
wages cannot function fully without a centralized negotiation system.
However, the public employer function of the government can be an
effective instrument of incomes policy. Experience in Sweden over the last
few years suggests that this is almost the only weapon in the incomes policy
arsenal that has not been exhausted. But this would imply, for example, that
the automatic element in the wage drift for public-sector employees would
be dropped (Elvander 1989). Elvander also asks whether it is possible that a
combination of central agreements on general issues (general wage limits,
working hours, equalization of benefits) on the one hand, and agreements at
the sectoral union level on the other, could solve the problem of satisfying
overall long-term interests as well as specific national union demands. Our
answer would be that, for the Swedish model to survive and to be imported
by other countries, ways have to be found that deal with these tensions
between the various negotiation levels. Of course, this is more easily said
than done, but Swedish experience with more decentralization has not been
unambiguously positive. ^^ For a country like Sweden with its openness, the
relation between wage-setting and macro-economic performance is of great
importance. It is not surprising, therefore, that a revision of the Swedish
model in the direction of a return to central negotiations is under discussion
(see also Ahlen 1989)." The SAF is now talking about a definite end to
national bargaining. However, recent developments in wage drift and the
deterioration of Swedish economic performance could be important in-
centives for a continuation of this discussion.
Finally, another problem needs to be pointed out. This deails with the
relationship between industrial relations and the structure of the labour
force. The core of the Swedish model has been developed in a period of high
participation with manufacturing as its main occupation area. However,
employment in the service sector has grown, especially during the last two
decades, and in the heterogeneity of the labour force. This will hamper the
organization in large unions and may lead to an increase in the number and
variety of unions and create co-ordination problems if wage-setting is
centralized. Moreover, the individual employment relationship itself will
change: there will be more temporary contracts, more fiexibility, more
part-time labour. Both of these developments may lead to other types of
industrial relations than the ones that have existed so long in Sweden (cf.
Delsen 1990c).
Sweden and the European Community
Finally, we want to mention one development that must be kept in mind
when discussing the suitability of the Swedish n[\ode\. Aitet 1992, fee102 British Journal of Industrial Relations
European internal market comes into being. This wilt increase competition
(and wage competition) and promote labour mobility. What will happen
when some countries adopt a Swedish approach and others do not? Will
labour leave the 'Swedish' countries in times of high employment and return
in times of high unemployment? Sweden has now applied to join the EC; if
she becomes a member, she may have to follow labour market policies that
will be dictated by European economic performance. A convergence of
labour market policies can be forced by economic circumstances.
5. Conclusion
In our view, the Swedish model has proved its value with regard to labour
market policy, especially concerning the duration of unemployment com-
pared with other European countries. The principle of 'active' rather than
'passive' labour market policy has prevented an increase in long-term
unemployment and counteracted hysteresis. In our view, this part of the
Swedish model can be imported by countries that suffer from high long-term
unemployment, and in this sense the Swedish model is (partially) relevant
for other countries. It is a way out of the unemployment trap. Supply-side
policies such as training or retraining programmes and a system of finite
benefits have increased functional flexibility. Swedish experience has
proved that active labour market policy may serve as an alternative to
deregulation in order to augment the fiexibility of the labour market.
Although the Swedish labour market is highly regulated, it is as flexible as
the USA or Japan (OECD 1989b: 83). However, as the recent past shows,
the Swedish model is under attack. It is an open question whether this mode!
can survive in a setting of decentralized bargains, increasing wage differ-
entials and an increasingly competitive world.
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Notes
1. The LO has for decades co-operated closely with the Social Democratic Party
(SAP), a fact that has contributed to the strength of the reformist labour
movement in Sweden.
2. It meant that the LO accepted the principle that the employer is entitled to direct
and allot work, and to hire labour, including non-organized labour. In return,
the SAF promised that the employers would respect the employees' free right of
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3. Owing to the fact that notification of vacancies is obligatory for employers, the
proportion of all job openings notified to the Public Employment Service is as
high as 2/3 in Sweden. Similar laws exist in Belgium, France, Italy and Spain,
though apparently with less effect. Shares vary between 1/10 and 1/6 for Austria,
Canada, the Netherlands and Switzerland; 1/4 for France; 1/3 for Australia,
Germany and the UK (OECD 1990a: 27, 89).
4. Labour market training is not an alternative to work; it is a tneans to make work
possible. In part, its effectiveness depends on the quality of the labour market
information on which individual training decisions are based. A iarge coverage
of vacancy information may therefore be crucial.
5. Supply-oriented measures are defined as those designed to improve matching,
geographical and occupational mobility, and rehabilitation. Demand-oriented
measures are tempjorary jobs, regional measures, employment for the hands-
capped and other employment creation measures.
6. Since the programmes vary with the unemployment situation, the best way to
measure a country's commitment to the active labour market policy is to
measure expenditures per unemployed person (relative to output per person).
This degree of commitment varies considerably, with Sweden doing much more
than any other country and West Germany doing more than any other EC
country (Layard 1989).
7. The hysteresis effect denotes cases where the 'natural' level of unemployment (a
proxy for the unemployment due to market imperfections) is a function of past
unemployment (Blanchard and Summers 1987; Bourdet and Persson 1989).
8. After January 1991 the highest income tax late wilJ stepwise be reduced to 50 per
cent and the variable corporate tax will be replaced by a uniform 30 per cent rate.
However, tbe tax base will be broadened to finance this tax cut. Tax revenue
losses are to be made up through higher taxes on capital, fewer tax deductibles
and a broader application of the VAT. The main motives behind this reform is to
make the market function more efficiently, to encourage people to work harder
and cheat less on taxes, and to revitalize tbe pubhc sector (Ahlen 1989: 342).
9. We are aware of the fact that the term 'corporatism' is not unambiguously
defined in the literature. However, centralization of wage negotiations, shared
perspectives on the goals of economic activity and explicit attention to the aims
of wage-setting seem to be important characteristics of a corporatist society.
Calmfors and DriffilJ (1988) give an overview of some definitions and the ranking
of countries according to these definitions. It shows that, whatever definition is
used, Sweden is characterized as a corporatist country.
10. In 1989 demand-oriented measures amounted to more than 45 per cent of total
expenditure on labour market policy, while supply-side measures accounted for
roughly 30 per cent and cash unemployment benefits for 24 per cent (Johan-
nesson 1989: 12).
11. The Oktin misery index is defined as the rate of inflation plus the rate of
unemployment. Tbe alternative performance index is measured by tbe sum of
the rate of unemployment plus the current account deficit as a percentage of
GDP.
12. This point can be illustrated by a quotation from the OECD: 'In regard of the
negotiation structure, developments through the 1980s have not been propi-
tious, though it may be expected that in tbe 1989 wage round the trend towards
greater decentralisation will be stopped . . . The question arises whether higher
differentials in recent years have not been more to the advantage of those104 British Journal of Industrial Relations
employed in sectors protected against foreign employment rather than in skiJI
categories associated with a dynamic industrial development. It may be that
more centralized negotiations, accompanied by measures to allow wage struc-
tures better to reflect underlying demand and supply trends, would significantly
improve the outcome of the wage-setting process' (OECD 1989b: 80).
13. In February 1990 the Swedish government announced a wage, price and rent
freeze. These measures underline the government's concern about tbe state of
the economy. Although they deviate from the Swedish model of free wage
negotiations, the LO has backed the plan.
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